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The economic wellbeing of a large number of rural Kosovar families depends heavily
on migrants’ remittances. This paper aims at analysing the impact of migration on rural
poverty and inequality in Kosovo. It draws on the 2009 nationally representative Kosovo
Remittance Study. Analyses are based on a comparison with counterfactual migrant
household incomes derived from Propensity Score Matching. We find that remittances
have no impact on the extremely poor, but lift around 40% of migrant households
above the vulnerability threshold. Gini coefficients show a tendency to increase due
to migration. Determinants of different outcomes of migration are explored in a logit
regression on migration success. Household and income structure as well as education
play a role in how migrant households climb up the income ladder.
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matching1 Introduction
Migrant remittances are known to be an important and stable source of income, not only in
the developing world, but also in many transition economies. Indeed, European transition
countries such as Albania, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are among the top recipients
of remittances as a portion of gross domestic product (GDP) (Mansoor and Quillin 2006).
In Kosovo, around one fifth of households are involved in labour migration, with this
proportion slightly higher in rural areas (United Nations Development Programme 2010).
Migration is well-known to be a coping strategy and a source of income that compensates
for the low employment rates in the country (Corbanese and Rosas 2007). The very high
unemployment rate of around 40%, plus the estimated number of 200,000 young people
who will enter the labour market within the coming five years, increases the pressure to mi-
grate. Indeed, 50% of the younger generation say they would emigrate if they could
(Haxhikadrija 2009). Currently, between 315,000 and 500,000 Kosovars live abroad, of whom
about 50% reside in Germany. It is estimated that every third household in Kosovo has fam-
ily members living abroad (Mustafa et al. 2007; European Stability Initiative 2006).
There is hardly any official and reliable data available on the remitted sums resulting
from this migration, because considerable amounts of the money are transferred informally
(World Bank 2010). The United Nations Development Programme (2010) estimates the
absolute amount of remittances in 2009 as € 443 million. The share of remittances is
estimated to represent around 13% of GDP.Möllers and Meyer; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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tion and remittances in Kosovo, which have been widely underrepresented in the migra-
tion and development literature (Vathi and Black 2007). Although a number of studies
have been published recently, most of the analyses are descriptive. The recent report of
Gashi and Haxhikadrija (2012) nicely summarises results of available data and migration
literature on Kosovo. Havolli (2011) and Meyer et al. (2012) provide more detailed ana-
lyses of the drivers of remitting. When the impact of remittances on households in Kosovo
is analysed, this is done based on a simple comparison of recipients and non-recipients:
for instance, in Haxhikadrija (2009); Möllers et al. (2013); and Elezaj et al. (2012).
In this contribution we highlight the impact of remittances on the welfare and in-
come distribution of the rural population1. The paper adds to the debate on the link-
ages between remittances and poverty and inequality (see, for instance, Taylor 1992;
Adams 2011; Lokshin et al. 2010). Unlike earlier studies on Kosovo, we base our ana-
lysis on counterfactual incomes derived from Propensity Score Matching (PSM). Our
main aim is to quantify the income-related outcomes of migration on (migrant sending)
rural households. In addition to changes in poverty and inequality indicators, we also
explore factors that determine household based success of migration (measured as an
upward shift in income quintiles among migrant households).
The paper is structured as follows: after a brief survey of the literature in Section 2,
we introduce our methodology and data in Section 3. Section 4 provides a descriptive
comparison of migrant and non-migrant households. The main analytical results are
presented in Section 5. We start from a comparison of income groups. Based on head-
count indices and using counterfactual incomes, we then determine the share of
migrant households that would fall into poverty without remittances. We show if and
how the rural income distribution is affected by mixed income structures – and espe-
cially by remittances. To analyse the marginal effect of remittances on inter-household
income distribution we calculate decomposed Gini coefficients and Gini elasticities.
Finally, an econometric analysis of the success factors linked to whether a rural migrant
household will climb up the income ladder is presented. The procedure applied for this
is a logit regression. Section 6 concludes.
2 A brief survey of the literature
This section briefly introduces migration and poverty related facts about Kosovo and
presents some key results and arguments of the discussion on the effect of migration
on poverty and inequality.
Kosovo’s economic situation is, and for a long time has been, challenging. The coun-
try was historically one of the poorest in the region, and it is still struggling with high
levels of poverty and low growth rates which, despite progress in recent years, are still
too low to significantly affect poverty reduction and extreme unemployment (United
States Agency for International Development 2008). The per capita income was esti-
mated at only € 1,760 in in 2009 (Gashi and Haxhikadrija 2012). This is also reflected
in the high shares of 34% and 12% of the population falling below the absolute and ex-
treme poverty lines respectively in 2009 (World Bank and SOK 2011); the Gini index
is, however, relatively modest at 0.30 (World Bank 2007a). The role that migration and
remittances might play in Kosovar households is reflected in the fact that nearly one in
ten households in Kosovo indicate that remittances are their main income source
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tances (around 20%) is substantially higher than the fraction receiving social assistance
(about 13%); the average amount of remittances is three times higher than the average
values from social protection programmes in recipient households. There is also evi-
dence that rural areas in particular, where poverty is usually more pressing than in
urban areas, enjoy higher average amounts of remittances (United Nations Develop-
ment Programme 2010; World Bank 2007a).
The World Bank (2007b) highlights migration as one of three (complementary) path-
ways out of rural poverty (the other two being farm intensification and specialisation,
and entering local non-farm labour). Indeed, the potential of migration and remittances
to significantly reduce acute poverty is widely discussed in the literature (Adams and
Page 2005; Lokshin et al. 2010). A large, and growing, number of multidisciplinary
micro-studies show that (temporary) migration helps to smooth seasonal income
fluctuations, to provide extra cash to meet contingencies, or to increase disposable
income (e.g. Mosse et al. 2002; Adams et al. 2008; Lokshin et al. 2010; Verme 2011; for
an overview of empirical studies in developing countries see Adams 2011).
While there is not much doubt that remittances increase the incomes of recipient house-
holds, their use is also important when discussing impacts on development. There is much
evidence that remittances are used primarily to increase consumption, in particular of food
and clothing, and less frequently for investment purposes (Davis et al. 2010; Mansoor and
Quillin 2006)2. Haxhikadrija (2009) reports that in Kosovo the receipt of remittances is often
followed by the purchase of leisure goods such as satellite dishes, mobile phones or cameras.
Next to daily expenses, rural households primarily use remittances to improve their basic
equipment, whereas investment in education seems rather rare; in rural areas the differences
in the possession of goods, such as televisions, refrigerators, washing machines and cars, be-
tween migrant and non-migrant households are clearly visible. As such expenses frequently
flow into imported goods, trickle down effects and thus longer term impacts on development
and poverty reduction may be hampered. For farm households in neighbouring Albania,
Miluka et al. (2010) suggest that migration is used by rural households as a way out of agri-
culture. For Kosovo there are, however, no indications that significant amounts of remittances
are used for this purpose, yet, those few households that do report business investments often
make use of remittances (Möllers et al. 2013; Gashi and Haxhikadrija 2012).
Another much debated issue is about who actually migrates and who receives remit-
tances. The causal link between migration and the wealth status of the labour-sending
household has direct implications for poverty and inequality effects. If people are in a pos-
ition to migrate (and increase their income) because they are better off in the first place,
then poverty effects will be lower. Most studies find that richer households receive more
remittances (Mansoor and Quillin 2006). However, a clear causal link cannot be made, be-
cause the drivers and impacts of migration are complex. Remittance flows depend on dif-
ferent underlying motives for getting involved in migration and for remitting. In the home
country household not only the financial flows but also the decision to send migrants in-
duces adjustments in the labour endowment and thus in income (and probably also con-
sumption) strategies (e.g. Meyer et al. 2012; Davis et al. 2010).
Similarly, inequality effects depend on the share of households receiving transfers,
the average amounts received (or how much migrants remit), and the distribution of
remittances among the population (which households are sending migrants and
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household is improved through remittances then overall inequality in the communities
might rise as a consequence (de Haan and Rogaly 2002). Whether or not migration in-
creases income inequality of the sending households due to the receipt of remittances
has not yet been fully clarified. Some researchers expect an increased inequality, for in-
stance if information and education are decisive for the (self-)selection of migrants
(Milanovic 1987). Indeed, Adams (2011), who reviews a large number of empirical
studies, finds that at the country level international remittances tend to increase in-
come inequality. Others argue that remittances contribute to a more equal income dis-
tribution, especially if trickle down effects are at work. Taylor and Wyatt (1996), for
instance, find that the indirect effects of remittances affect the household farm income
distribution positively. Giannetti et al. (2009) present small but equalising distributional
effects for a number of Eastern European countries. Barham and Boucher (1998) argue
that inequality outcomes are sensitive to the choice of method. Differences can, for ex-
ample, be attributed to value judgements regarding the weight attached to certain in-
come groups when constructing inequality measures (Stark et al. 1988).
In summary, the literature does not provide clear directions for the effects of migration
on home country households. We base our analysis of Kosovo on the widely accepted hy-
pothesis that migration has positive direct effects on both migrants’ rural incomes and rural
incomes in general. Thus, we expect remittances to reduce poverty, even if a counterfactual
income is used for comparison. We further expect remittances to increase inequality, as mi-
grants tend to be concentrated in better educated and wealthier households.
3 Methodology and data
This paper draws on the recent and representative dataset of the Kosovo Remittance
Study (KRS) (United Nations Development Programme 2010). The KRS acknowledges
the major importance that remittances play in the economy of Kosovo. Its particular
strength is its large sample of 4,000 households which allows for a truly quantitative
view on the issue. Our study looks at a subsample of 1,727 rural households from this
database3. The sample size is reduced due to missing data after casewise deletion for
some variables in the econometric analyses.
The analysis focuses on the effect of remittances on poverty and inter-household income
inequality. According to Adams (2011), there are at least four methodological problems that
confront any economic work on international migration: simultaneity, reverse causality, se-
lection bias and omitted variable bias. Yet, appropriate solutions, although available in the-
ory, are difficult to implement in practice. For instance, experimental designs are almost
impossible to obtain, and panel data are rarely available. Sample selection procedures and
the use of instrumental variables are the most commonly used solutions. Instrumental vari-
ables may, in theory, remove many of the biases that arise from endogeneity, selection bias
and omitted variables, but the difficulty comes in specifying good instruments. A fully con-
vincing set of suitable instruments in a migration regime is not available yet; there are many
different arguments put forward to support the choice of particular instruments but better
conceived instruments are generally lacking (Miluka et al. 2010; Davis et al. 2010).
Furthermore, analytical results on remittances and income depend on whether remit-
tances are treated as a substitute for local earnings or as an exogenous transfer. Thus,
this touches on the question of whether or not the opportunity costs of migration are
Möllers and Meyer IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 5 of 182014, 3:16
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/16taken into account. This issue can be addressed by constructing a counterfactual
situation reflecting what the status of a migrant household would have been had that
household not involved itself in migration (McKenzie and Sasin 2007). In our analysis,
we apply the method of PSM to estimate counterfactual incomes from which the
poverty and inequality effects are assessed. PSM estimators have been developed to
correct for non-random (self-)selection and to pair treated observations (with migrants)
with similar controls (without migrants). The outcome of the control observation can
be interpreted as the counterfactual income of the treated observations (in the absence
of treatment) (Jimenez-Soto and Brown 2012).
The applied PSM methodology consists of the following steps. First, a logit or probit
model of migrant and non-migrant households is estimated. The parameters of this
model, that should be unaffected by treatment and fulfil the unconfoundedness condi-
tion, are used in the second step to predict the propensity score, which expresses the
predicted probability of a household engaging in migration4. Third, migrant and non-
migrant households are matched; the observed income of the matched non-migrant
household is imputed as the counterfactual income of the migrant household.
In our analysis, we use a set of socio-economic variables to estimate a logit model on
the treatment variable (migrant households) (Additional file 1: Tables S1 and S2). For
the PSM procedure we use the psmatch2 and teffects psmatch Stata modules; for the
choice of variables we relied on recommendations given by Caliendo and Kopeinig
2008). The method by which the matched pairs were formed was the three nearest
neighbour procedure allowing replacement. The robustness of the results was tested
along different specifications including caliper, radius and kernel matching. Tests
for balance and common support were undertaken. Successful matching was
checked along the bias reduction and t-test (Additional file 1: Table S3), and Pseudo
R2 (Additional file 1: Table S4) (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Furthermore, overlap must
be given to ensure the common support assumption. Additional file 1: Figure S1 presents
visual analysis results of propensity score distributions. Since the bootstrap standard
errors for PSM estimators are not in general found to be valid, we rely on standard
errors obtained from Stata teffects psmatch for the calculation of treatment effects;
the underlying methodology is based on the work of Abadie and Imbens (2012).
Rosenbaum bounds are calculated to test the sensitivity of estimated treatment
effects with respect to unobservables (Additional file 1: Table S5).
The derived counterfactual incomes are used in the analysis of poverty and inequality
effects as well as in a logit model in which we aim to explore further the success factors
of migration.
Poverty is measured not only along income groups (tertiles and quintiles), but also by
three standard poverty measures: (1) the headcount index; (2) the poverty deficit index;
and (3) the poverty severity index (Foster et al. 1984). The three poverty measures by
Foster et al. (1984) are described by










where z is the poverty line, ci is the income of the individual i, n is the total number of
individuals and m is the number of poor individuals. The parameter α changes
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headcount index indicating the proportion of the poor below the poverty line. P(1) dis-
plays the poverty deficit, a measure that takes into account how far the poor, on aver-
age, fall below the poverty line. Finally, if α is set equal to 2, we obtain P(2), called the
poverty severity measure, which captures the difference in the severity of poverty by giv-
ing more weight to the poorest. Thus, poverty severity accounts for income differences
(World Bank 2000; Coudouel et al. 2000).
The choice of poverty lines is a critical issue, especially if policy conclusions are
drawn. Ravallion (1998) discusses alternative approaches to setting and implementing
poverty lines. In general, absolute poverty lines, which have a fixed real value over time
and space, are preferable to relative poverty lines that rise with the average income and
expenditure levels. Poverty lines may be set according to food intake or cost-of-basic-
needs. In addition, subjective perceptions are sometimes used to set poverty lines. In
our approach we show results for several poverty lines. As a measure of absolute and
extreme poverty we use a line that was suggested by the World Bank and SOK (2011)
for Kosovo. It is calculated based on a cost-of-basic-needs approach. This poverty line
lies somewhat below the commonly used 2-$ per day- line suggested for Eastern
European countries (Alam et al. 2005). Another absolute poverty line that has been
used for this region is set at US$4.30 per day. This is supposed to reflect a vulnerability
threshold in order to identify households which are not suffering absolute material
deprivation, but are vulnerable to poverty. Although it seems somewhat arbitrary, it
does bear some relationship to empirically observed vulnerability to poverty (Alam
et al. 2005). Finally we also present a relative poverty line which is used in, for example,
Eurostat statistics. However, we stress that absolute poverty lines are certainly more
relevant in the context of our study.
Poverty analyses often refer to adjusted household sizes which are used to calculate
per capita incomes that consider economies of scale. Economies of scale arise in many
ways in a family, for example by sharing certain expenditures such as housing or a car.
There are different methods for estimating equivalence scales. Here we use figures that
reflect the so-called modified OECD equivalence scale which is also used by Eurostat.
It assigns the coefficient 1 to the household head, 0.5 to other adults in the household,
and 0.3 to children under the age of 16.
The effect of certain income sources on income distribution can be determined by
Gini coefficients5 in two ways (Reardon et al. 2000). The most common method is the
comparison of a Gini coefficient for all incomes with another Gini coefficient that is
calculated excluding the income source of interest (in our case, remittance income). If
the latter is smaller than the Gini based on total income, this income source has a
negative effect on the income distribution, and vice versa. In addition, decomposition
according to different income sources allows conclusions to be drawn regarding the
relative distribution effect of certain sources. The contribution of each income source
is the product of a concentration coefficient for that income source and the fraction of
that income source in total income (Shorrocks 1982; World Bank 2000). Formally Gk ,
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where Sk = μk/μ is the share of component k in total income. The percentage contribu-
tion of income source k to total income equality is found to be











4 Descriptive statistics: a comparison of migrant and non-migrant
households
The objective of this section is to briefly introduce the rural Kosovar household to the
reader. Bearing in mind our research question, we present important differences in the
demographic- and income-related variables of migrant and non-migrant households in
the sample that also inform the main results in Section 5.
Rural households in Kosovo are typically big. The 1,727 rural households of the KRS have,
on average, five family members (with considerable variation in the household size)6. The
average age of the household head is 50 years. Around 28% of the households are cate-
gorised as migrant households, meaning that they have at least one family member living
abroad; on average the number of migrants is 2.5. About 60% of these migrant households
receive remittances. In the overall sample around 17% receive remittances. Table 1 presents
socio-economic variables of migrant and non-migrant rural households; the non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis test, indicating whether the mean, frequency or median are equally based on
calculated ranks, is used to test for significant differences.
Migration depends on the availability of work force in a household. Therefore it is no
surprise that migrant households tend to be bigger, however their dependency ratio is
also slightly higher than non-migrant households (0.60 versus 0.49)7. Education is
sometimes mentioned as a key door opener for migration activities. But although the
educational attainment of the rural household heads is generally high (almost eleven
years of schooling), it does not differ significantly between migrant and non-migrant
households. The same is true for the highest level of education within the household8.
The average annual household income (excluding remittances) lies at around € 4,800
per annum (Table 1). When remittances are not considered in the household income,
differences between migrant and non-migrant households are not significant; if remit-
tances are included, migrant households have significantly higher household and per
capita incomes. Per capita incomes that include remittances, calculated based on equiv-
alised household sizes (see Section 3), are 70% higher for migrant households than for
non-migrant households (€ 2,633 versus € 1,840).
Table 1 Socio-economic characteristics of rural households with and without migrants
All
households
Migrant household=1 Test statistics
1 0 χ2 / p
Number of rural HH 1727.00 479.00 1248.00 –
HH size 4.97 5.03 4.95 0.677 / 0.411
Dependency ratio 0.52 0.60 0.49 10.067 / 0.002
Age of HH head 49.85 52.47 48.85 23.354 / 0.000
Years of education of HH head 10.95 10.68 11.06 2.132 / 0.144
Number of migrants 0.71 2.54 0.00 1673.087 / 0.000
Highest level of education in HH
- Primary School (up to 4 years) or lower 2.21 2.30 2.17 0.025 / 0.875
- Secondary General School (~8 years) 8.25 9.81 7.64 2.149 / 0.143
- Vocational or Grammar School (~12 years) 50.35 47.60 51.41 2.005 / 0.157
- University degree 39.20 40.29 38.78 0.333 / 0.564
Household income (€) 4,819 5,177 4,682 0.420 / 0.517
Household income incl. remittances (€) 5,249 6,728 4,682 65.323 / 0.000
PC income, equivalised (€) 1,889 2,017 1,840 2.265 / 0.133
PC income incl. remittances, equivalised (€) 2,060 2,633 1,840 82.672 / 0.000
Income shares (%)
- Waged employment 66.62 58.83 74.52 106.554 / 0.000
- Self-employment 10.66 6.47 11.22 4.440 / 0.035
- Remittances 5.14 13.15 0.00 811.168 / 0.000
- Other income 17.58 18.16 12.50 15.536 / 0.000
Source: Own calculation based on KRS 2010 data.
Note: N=1,727 rural households; HH=household, PC = per capita.
Test statistics refer to a Kruskal-Wallis-Test.
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Indeed, 70% of all rural households have waged employment as their primary income
source. The income share is lower for migrant households (59%). Remittances make up
on average 13% of their income. Overall, the share of remittances in all households lies
at around 5%;9 remittances make up the largest income share in less than 4% of the
rural households10. Self-employment is the primary income source of around 11% of all
rural households. It plays a slightly bigger role in the income portfolio of non-migrant
households (11% income share versus 6% in migrant households). Thus, it does not
seem that remittances are a key to open up business opportunities (see also Section 2).
Despite the extraordinary agro-ecological potential for agricultural activities, rural
households rely to a relatively low degree on farm incomes (unfortunately not included
in the KRS database). National statistics show that only around 6% of Kosovar house-
holds indicate that farm incomes are their major income source, and the contribution
to overall individual incomes is only 1% (Statistical Office of Kosovo 2010). Even for
farm households this share at 13% is surprisingly low, most likely due to the small aver-
age farm size of less than three hectares and low levels of market orientation (Möllers
et al. 2013).
The category ‘other income’ in Table 1 is mainly derived from pensions or social
payments. At the national level, social welfare benefits account for 2% of individual
incomes, pensions from Kosovo for 6% and pensions from abroad for 4% of the
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ingly large share (18%) to total rural household incomes (Table 1); around 14% indicate
that ‘other income’ is their main source of income. The significant difference between
migrant and non-migrant households is probably due to former or current migrants
having access to pensions from abroad.
In a nutshell, although migrant households do not seem to be better educated, they
enjoy higher incomes. The absolute income difference is significant when remittances
are considered. For both migrant and non-migrant households waged employment is
the most important income source. Migrant households rely less on self-employment,
but more on transfers such as from remittances, pensions or social assistance.
5 Main findings: effects of remittances on poverty and inequality in Rural
Kosovo
In this section we provide evidence about the welfare effects of remittances on rural
households. In the previous section we showed that remittances contribute significantly
to absolute incomes of migrant households. Now we look at the overall poverty
situation by presenting results on income groups and poverty indices. This is followed
by an inequality analysis. Finally, with the aim of understanding how poverty reduction
could be addressed more effectively through migration, we explore factors that deter-
mine migration success.
Effects on poverty and inequality depend on the number of recipients, absolute
remittances amounts, and on who sends migrants and receives remittances. This last
aspect, addressing the question of whether proportionally more migrants come from
lower or higher income groups (Milanovic 1987) and how these income groups are
characterised, is presented in Table 2; we distinguish three income classes (tertiles),
where the first tertile is the income class with the lowest per capita income and the
third tertile is the richest group.
Indeed, poorer households have significantly fewer migrants, and less than 10%
receive remittances at all (Table 2). In particular, the number of migrant households
(with at least one migrant) is significantly higher in wealthier households11. Accord-
ingly, the percentage contribution of remittances to the income portfolios rises from
the poor to the wealthy tertile. In the wealthiest income class more than one quarter of
households receive remittances; for 7% of households in the third tertile remittances
are their main income source. The absolute value that remittances add to per capita
incomes leads to an income rise of 13% compared to 3–4% in the other tertiles.
Whether these households have climbed the ladder towards this tertile or were better
off in the first place is an important question. One indication for the amount of upward
shifting is shown in a comparison for tertile membership in a counterfactual situation
(where the observed income of the matched non-migrant household is imputed as
counterfactual income of the migrant household) and the actual situation: 6% moved
from tertile 1 in the counterfactual scenario towards tertile 2 in the actual scenario.
Almost 20% of wealthy households in tertile 3 come from the counterfactual tertiles
1 and 2.
An indicator for the existence of income inequality within rural Kosovar households
is shown in Table 2 in the fact that the richest income group earns more than half of
all incomes, while the share of the poorest tertile in all household incomes is only 16%.
Table 2 Socio-economic characteristics according to income classes
All
households
Income class (tertile) Test statistics
1 2 3 χ2 / p
Number of rural HH 1727.00 576.00 575.00 576.00 —
Share of remittances receiving HH in % 16.79 9.38 14.43 26.56 72.427 / 0.000
HH size 4.97 5.60 4.90 4.43 0.049 / 0.976
Dependency ratio 0.52 0.65 0.47 0.43 3.078 / 0.215
Age of HH head 49.85 50.10 50.13 49.32 1.766 / 0.414
Number of migrants 0.71 0.42 0.64 1.06 3.998 / 0.135
Share of HH with at least one migrant 27.74 17.19 25.39 40.63 81.249 / 0.000
Years of education of HH head 10.95 10.15 11.18 11.52 4.574 / 0.102
Highest level of education in HH in %
- Primary School (up to 4 years) or lower 2.21 4.20 1.39 1.04 6.171 / 0.046
- Secondary General School (~8 years) 8.25 13.46 5.39 5.91 49.644 / 0.000
- Vocational or Grammar School (~12 years) 50.35 51.75 52.87 46.43 4.087 / 0.130
- University degree 39.20 30.59 40.35 46.61 28.244 / 0.000
Household income (€) 4,819 2,506 4,255 7,695 8.427 / 0.015
Household income incl. remittances (€) 5,249 2,577 4,469 8,700 8.570 / 0.014
PC income, equivalised (€) 1,889 852 1,599 3,216 9.020 / 0.011
PC income incl. remittances, equivalised (€) 2,060 877 1,667 3,637 9.449 / 0.009
Income shares (%)
- Waged employment 66.62 54.07 73.28 72.50 2.038 / 0.361
- Self-employment 10.66 14.44 9.96 7.59 3.667 / 0.160
- Remittances 5.14 2.59 4.05 8.77 6.000 / 0.050
- Other income 17.58 28.89 12.72 11.14 2.352 / 0.308
HH with remittances as main income source (%) 3.65 2.08 1.74 7.12 29.688 / 0.000
Household spending (€ per month) 130.80 83.28 130.10 179.66
Household food expenditures (%) 40.63 44.56 40.70 38.28
Share in all household incomes (%) 100.00 16.37 28.35 55.28
Upward shift compared to tertile based on
counterfactual migrant incomes
8.51 – 6.09 19.44
Source: Own calculation based on KRS 2010 data.
Note: N=1,727 rural households; Tertile 1 = Income class with the lowest per capita income (incl. remittances) etc.
HH=household, PC = per capita.
The test statistics refer to a Kruskal-Wallis-Test.
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is around 70% higher than that of the first, while the richest group has more
than three times as much as the first, and almost double the income compared
to the middle tertile. Differences in per capita incomes are even higher. One
reason for the income differences may be seen in the better educational attain-
ment in the higher tertiles: the number of years in education of the household
head increases from the poor to the better-off. The wealthiest income class has a
particularly high share of university education (this indicator looks at the highest
level of education in the household). Poor households are represented with a
significantly higher share in primary and secondary education and a lower share
in university degrees.
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basis of three different poverty lines12. We have chosen two absolute poverty lines, and
one relative poverty line (see Section 3).
The consumption based poverty line of € 1.55 per day in 2009 prices that is used by
the World Bank and SOK (2011) seems, from our point of view, very low. This poverty
line reflects the social assistance level that a person gets in Kosovo, € 40 per month
(Statistical Office of Kosovo 2010), an amount which is, according to what we saw dur-
ing our survey work, hard to live off in the country. It is also far below the average ex-
penditure of the poorest tertile of the KRS rural households of around € 83 per person
per month (Table 2). Thus it clearly reflects extreme poverty. According to this poverty
line, 7% of the rural sample are considered extremely poor. The poverty deficit, defined
as the average distance of the poor to the poverty line, is 2%. The measure of poverty
severity considers income differences by giving more weight to the poorest. In other
words, greater weight is given to households that are further away from the poverty
line. It lies at 1% for this extreme poverty line.
Vulnerability to poverty is reflected in the PPP-US$ 4.30 line. Here, the vulnerability
incidence lies at 45%. For the PPP-US$ 4.30 line the poverty deficit (16%) and poverty
severity (8%) are slightly higher than for the measure of extreme poverty. The chosen
relative poverty line of 60% of the median13 of the equivalised per capita income is
below the PPP-US$ 4.30 line. It results in a poverty incidence of 20%; poverty deficit is
at 6% and poverty severity at 3%.
The impact of migration and remittances on poverty is depicted in the last two col-
umns of Table 3. Obviously, results depend on the poverty line. Differences between a
‘naïve’ comparison of a headcount index calculated based on incomes without consider-
ing remittances and the counterfactual income approach are relatively small. Still, the
expected overestimation of the positive impact of remittances on poverty reduction is
visible14. Overall, poverty levels would rise between 0% and 3% if households were not
supported by their family members living abroad (based on counterfactual incomes). Ex-
treme poverty seems to be unaffected by remittances. This may be explained by the self-
selection of migrants from the middle and higher income groups. Poverty reduction based
on the PPP-US$ 4.30 line from 0.48 and 0.45 reflects an absolute number of 200 rural mi-
















€ 1.55 line, 2009 prices* 566 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.07
PPP-US$ 4.30 line 1,453 0.45 0.16 0.08 0.51 0.48
Relative poverty line
60% of sample median** 930 0.20 0.06 0.03 0.22 0.21
Source: Own calculation based on KRS 2010 data.
N=8,591 rural household members from both subgroups with and without migrants
*Absolute poverty line used by the World Bank (2011) for Kosovo on the basis of a cost-of-basic needs approach
for 2009.
**This poverty line corresponds to 60% of the median equivalised per capita income within the sample.
Table 4 Average treatment effect on migrant households
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference Std. Err. T-stat
Per capita income (pcincequrem) Unmatched 2578.85378 1834.50793 744.345851 113.049411 6.58
ATT 1834.50793 1893.62923 685.224549 160.721832 4.26
Test for significance based on AI robust Std. Err. *** according to Abadie and
Imbens (2012)
687.5878 157.1407 4.38
Source: Own calculation based on KRS 2010 data.
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are raised above the threshold due to remittances.
The effect of migration on migrant households is also shown in the average treatment
effect on the treated that results from PSM analysis. Migration leads to an average
income increase of around € 690 per year in migrant households (Table 4).
Table 5 depicts rural Gini coefficients and addresses the question of whether remit-
tances play a role with regards to income inequality. The income distribution was
calculated for total equivalised per capita incomes, for per capita incomes excluding
remittances, and for the counterfactual scenario. The national Gini coefficient for the
year 2005 was about 0.30 (World Bank 2007a). The Gini coefficient of 0.37 for the sam-
ple indicates a slightly higher inequality for our rural population. If remittances are not
considered (‘naïve’ approach), the Gini coefficient goes down slightly to 0.36. Using
counterfactual incomes, the Gini is 0.35. The examination of partial coefficients calcu-
lated on the basis of decomposed Gini coefficients confirms this tendency towards an
un-equalising effect of remittances (positive elasticity in brackets in the lower part of
Table 5). This is in line with the fact that remittances are the most unevenly distributed
income source and, as we have seen, tend to be concentrated in richer income groups.
The elasticity figure indicates that a 1% increase in remittances would lead to a 6.9%
increase in the Gini coefficient. Yet, if we assume that migrants tend to be concentrated
in the upper segments of the income distribution, the effect is most likely overesti-
mated (see Acosta et al. 2008). Similarly to remittances, waged employment increases
income inequality. Incomes from self-employment and ‘other income’ decrease inequal-
ity: their elasticities are negative.
We have seen that migration lifts a large proportion of migrant households out of
poverty, but not all migrant households are able to achieve a significant upward shift inTable 5 Income distribution and remittances
Gini coefficient
▪ on the basis of equivalised per capita incomes 0.37
▪ remittances excluded 0.36
▪ using counterfactual incomes 0.35
Decomposed Gini coefficients (elasticity in brackets)
▪ on the basis of waged incomes 0.38 ( 0.029)
▪ on the basis of self-employment 0.19 (−0.044)
▪ on the basis of remittances 0.67 ( 0.069)
▪ on the basis of other incomes 0.22 (−0.054)
Source: Own calculation based on KRS 2010 data.
Note: N=1,727 rural households from both subgroups with and without migrants.
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the success of rural households’ migration activities in Kosovo. An underlying
hypothesis is that households which can increase their income enough to move at least
one quintile upwards differ significantly in their socioeconomic variables. We measure
this upward movement as a positive change between the quintile based on counterfac-
tual migrant household income compared to the actual income quintile. The dummy
turns one for this positive quintile shift. For households that start from the highest
quintile the dummy turns one if they reach a 20% increase in incomes compared to the
counterfactual situation. We use a set of classical socio-economic independent variables
as typically used in poverty analyses and regress them on our sample of 479 migrant
households (389 after casewise deletion). The model presented in Table 6 has an overall
good fit. Descriptive statistics can be found in the Additional file 1: Table S6.
A positive shift in quintiles is reached by 185 successful migrant households (48%).
These households are characterised by a higher educational level, i.e. a universityTable 6 Logit regression on successful migration (quintile upward move)
Independent variables Coefficient Std. Err. Sig. Exp(B) 95% Conf. Interval
agehhh 0.171 0.067 0.011 1.186 1.039 1.353
agehhh2 −0.002 0.001 0.006 0.998 0.997 0.999
genderhhh 0.607 0.419 0.148 1.834 0.807 4.170
eduyhhh −0.052 0.053 0.328 0.949 0.856 1.053
unemployed −0.720 0.329 0.028 0.487 0.255 0.927
Albanian 0.702 0.387 0.069 2.018 0.946 4.308
maxeduhigh 0.796 0.326 0.015 2.216 1.170 4.198
depratio −0.725 0.257 0.005 0.484 0.293 0.801
sumofactive −0.437 0.112 0.000 0.646 0.519 0.804
nomigr −0.020 0.068 0.765 0.980 0.857 1.120
munrem2009_2 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
rem 0.016 0.006 0.010 1.017 1.004 1.029
cfpcinc −0.002 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.998 0.999
Prishtina −0.021 0.712 0.976 0.979 0.243 3.949
Mitrovica −0.763 0.758 0.314 0.466 0.105 2.062
Peje −0.763 0.768 0.320 0.466 0.104 2.098
Gjilan −0.612 0.768 0.426 0.542 0.120 2.443
Prizren −0.056 0.762 0.942 0.946 0.212 4.209
Ferizaj −0.067 0.748 0.928 0.935 0.216 4.049
constant −0.037 1.909 0.985 0.964
Number of observations = 389
migrant households.
chi2(19) = 175.063.
Prob > chi2 = 0.000.
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.484.
Hosmer Lemeshow chi2 (8) = 4.324.
Prob > chi2 = 0.827.
Source: Own calculation based on KRS 2010 data.
Note: Dependent variable: successful migration (dummy that turns 1 if household moves upwards to a higher quintile
compared to the counterfactual situation; for migrant household starting from the highest quintile a 20% increase in
incomes turns the dummy to 1).
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education of the household head is not significant. An upward movement in quintiles
is further related to the age of the household head. The probability for the move
increases with age, but decreases again from some point on. It is higher for ethnic
Albanian households. A dummy variable indicating whether a household head is
unemployed or not is significant too: unsurprisingly, unemployment has a negative in-
fluence on migration success. With regard to the household composition we find that
an increasing number of dependents lowers the probability for a positive shift. How-
ever, the same is true for an increasing number of household members of working age.
Thus it seems that smaller households with a small share of dependents are best off in
terms of achieving the move to a higher quintile. While the regional dummies give no
significant results, a variable that displays the squared average absolute remittances re-
ceived in a municipality is significant. Thus, very high municipality averages are linked
to the successful migration of individual migrant households as well. The share of re-
mittances in the current household income increases the probability of moving up the
quintiles. Interestingly, the counterfactual income is significant with a negative impact
on migration success. We interpret this as follows: our success indicator, an upward
shift between quintiles, is comparatively easier to reach for poorer household. This is
due to the lower absolute income rise that is needed for the move between lower quin-
tiles compared to the move between the fourth and fifth quintile in particular.
Summing up our main findings, we show that migration has the expected positive
effect on rural incomes. However, the poorest tend to benefit less. For the extremely
poor, we find no impact on poverty reduction at all. This is explained by the fact that
migrants and remittances are more often found in wealthier and better educated house-
holds. According to our counterfactual scenario, migrant households increase their
income significantly by almost € 700 per year. However, not all migrant households are
labelled successful. Those who are able to climb the income ladder often come from
small households with not many dependent members in the lower income groups.
They are characterised by higher education. The share of remittances in their house-
hold income is high, and a location in a municipality with high remittances increases
the probability for success. Effects on income distribution point towards an increase in
inequality through remittances, which again might be attributed to the fact that remit-
tances tend to flow towards wealthier households and do not reach the poorest.
6 Conclusion
In Kosovo a saying goes, a family needs ‘one son for the family, who stays at home, one
for migration, who works abroad, and one for the mother country’. Indeed, many rural
Kosovar households are involved in migration and they benefit from remittances. But is
‘one son for migration’ really needed in rural Kosovo to be able to make ends meet?
Are remittances helping to find a pathway out of poverty? We cannot give a
definite answer to these questions, because this would need longitudinal data, but our
counterfactual scenarios strongly indicate that remittances are indeed important in the
fight against poverty in rural Kosovar households.
First, we show that migrant households have higher absolute incomes, and the share
of remittances in the income of migrant households is significant (13%). Second,
poverty indicators calculated based on counterfactual incomes show that, depending on
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families are no longer poor due to their access to remittances. However, the effect is
not seen to apply to the extremely poor who generally have less access to remittances.
Third, with regard to distributional effects, we find (based on decomposition and a
comparison with counterfactual incomes) that migration makes the income distribution
more unequal. This can be taken as a hint that those who do not take part in migration
activities and do not benefit from remittances fall behind.
According to our counterfactual scenario, migrant households increase their income sig-
nificantly by almost € 700 per year. However, not all migrant households are able to climb
the income ladder. Successful migration certainly depends on various factors, some of them
complex or even unobservable. Starting from a set of classical socio-economic factors, we
show that the household structure and the wealth status are decisive for the migration out-
come. Migrant households which are successful are further characterised by significantly
higher education levels than migrant households with lower educational levels. This is not
the case for migrant households as a whole where, compared with non-migrant house-
holds, differences in education are not significant. This results from the fact that better edu-
cation is typically found in the upper income tertile, where successful migrant households
rather do not come from. We therefore conclude that education is one key for making mi-
gration a pathway out of poverty: it allows families to climb the income ladder through mi-
gration. Certainly other factors might have an important influence on migration outcomes
and thus on poverty too. Our analysis is limited at this stage as we would have liked to in-
clude additional relevant variables such as risk behaviour or attitudes of the migrant.
With regard to policy conclusions, first, we stress that the poorest seem to benefit
least from migration. Therefore it is necessary to monitor the income distribution. Only
if trickle down effects materialise may a drop in income equality be avoided in the
longer term. Social security policies are important in supporting those who are most
vulnerable and excluded from migration benefits. Second, our analysis shows that
migration is not solely beneficial for better off households: in fact within the group of
migrant households, poorer households in particular are able to turn migration into
success. Making migration a success story is key to poverty reduction based on remit-
tances. Education seems to be among the most important factors to achieve this.
Endnotes
1 The focus on rural households is justified because it is known that they tend to
benefit more from remittances than urban households, and are also more affected by
poverty (Haxhikadrija 2009).
2 However, Göbel (2013) finds for Ecuador that remittance inflows increase expendi-
tures on education, health, and housing.
3 The subsample refers to the subset of rural households with complete income data.
Households with more than ten household members are not included due to missing
data in the KRS database (for these households it is not possible to calculate the correct
per capita incomes that are needed for the analyses).
4 PSM assumes that the treatment satisfies some form of exogeneity, meaning that the
selection is on observables. The assumption of unconfoundedness implies that systematic
differences in outcomes between treated and untreated units with the same value for co-
variates are attributable to treatment. Thus, it relies on a set of observable variables that
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http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/16captures all relevant differences between the treated and control group so that the non-
treatment outcome is independent of the treatment status, conditional on those charac-
teristics; the possible existence of unobservables correlated with the migration decision is
a limitation to the application of the method (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, Jimenez-Soto
and Brown 2012, Imbens and Rubin 2014).
5 The Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure of income distribution. Its value
varies between zero and one, with zero indicating a perfectly equal income distribution.
The higher a Gini coefficient is, the more unequally incomes are distributed. Gini coeffi-
cients between 0.25 and 0.35 are considered ‘reasonable’, while coefficients higher than 0.5
indicate that income distribution is seriously unbalanced (Ellis 2000).
6 The average household size of five household members is underestimated: it does
not include households with more than ten household members because they are
excluded from the sample due to missing data in the KRS 2010 database (see above).
7 Pure pensioner households are excluded because dependency ratios cannot be calculated.
8 Pastore et al. (2013) point at significant gender differences: young women tend to
have a lower level of education and are less likely to be employed.
9 Milanovic (1987) in his study of Yugoslav households provides remittances income
shares for the 1973, 1978 and 1983 in which the percentages for Yugoslavia were given
as between 3% and 5%. He stresses that remittances are consistently higher among farm
households (10%-15%).
10 The Statistical Office of Kosovo (2010) estimates this share to be around 10% in
Kosovo.
11 This is also the case if tertiles are calculated based on counterfactual incomes
derived from PSM.
12 Although it is often argued that consumption-based poverty indicators are prefera-
ble, we concentrate in our analysis on income-based indicators. While consumption
and income differ only moderately for the first two tertiles, the consumption data and
income data are strikingly different for the third tertile – probably due to higher invest-
ment and saving activities that are not depicted in the KRS database.
13 We use the sample median income, a number that is expected to be somewhat
below the national median because we look at rural households only.
14 Acosta et al. (2008) confirm this on an empirical basis for a number of Latin
American countries. They point out that when no imputations are made for the income
of remittance senders, countries where recipients are concentrated at the bottom of the
distribution of non-remittance income exhibit much higher reductions in poverty head-
counts attributable to remittances. Nonetheless, they stress that the effects of remit-
tances are in either case far from negligible.
Additional file
: Table S1. Descriptive statistics of variables in the PSM logit model. Table S2: PSM logit
results - psmatch2: NN (3). Table S3: Testing the balance of covariates and absolute bias reduction. Table S4: R2
of raw and matched model. Table S5: Rosenbaum bounds test for sensitivity. Table S6: Descriptive statistics of
variables in the logit model on successful migration. Figure S1: Overlap graph.
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